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ABSTRACT
Although the GCC member states fulfill the GMU fiscal convergence criteria
quoted from the EU, this paper indicates that these criteria did not suit the GCC
economies. By clarifying the economic differences between the GCC region and the
EU, studying the GCC economies fiscal data, and learning from the EU and the GCC
member states experiences, the paper finds that: (i) The deficit and debt strategies did
not fit the GCC' economics index by requiring economic depended on surplus and
lower debt level strategies to design their fiscal criteria. (ii)The GCC government
budgetsdepend highly on oil and gas. The macroeconomic shocksthat the GCC region
may face andits response to them are totally different than what affects the EU.So
theGCC member states should have additional fiscal criteria, namely oil and gas
sector share criterion and government expenditure, to reduce the potential danger of
this dependency. (iii) To achieve and maintain fiscal discipline in the GMUand limit
the politic influence and the regional authority on fiscal policies, GCC economies
have to promote the permanent role of the criteria and set a strict timetablethat cannot
be waived whatever the political desires. Furthermore, they need to adopt
supranational independent institutions – before creating the GMU--that apply
multilateral surveillance on the union economic activities.
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1- INTRODUCTION
For more than 30 years, the six-member states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) - the Kingdom of Bahrain, State of Kuwait, Sultanate of Oman, State
of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)have
spent considerable effort and made significant progressto achieve the Gulf Monetary
Union (GMU) that is not yet built. The GCC member states have adopted the same
monetary and fiscal convergence criteriato be fulfilled by thepotential candidates for
GMU,as the same criteria that the European Monetary Union (EMU) have
designed.Thus the main purpose of this paper is to indicate that the current fiscal
convergent criteriafor the GMUdid not suit the GCC economies. Additionally, this
paper provides some suggestions regarding the fiscal criteria to put the GCC member
states on the right track in designing appropriate fiscal convergence criteria.
Althoughthe EMU--which is considered the most significant currency union-could be a good realistic model for the GMU due to its precedence and superiority,
the GMU fiscal convergence criteria should not beliterally quoted from the EMU
criteria. The EMU hasto rely on its economic index instead, and that is because:
First, the economy of the European Union and the GCC region are not strictly
comparable because the former is at a more-developed stage than the latter. The
EUeconomy’s size and structure are way beyond the GCC economy. In addition, the
EU includes economies that are considered among thelargest advanced economies in
the world such as Germany and France, andit relies on heavy manufacturing sectors
and high levels of diversification.However, theGCC region highly depends on rich
natural resources in oil, gas, and the activities related to those resources. That
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meansthat the microeconomic shocksthat the GCC region may face andits response to
them are totally different than what affects the EU.
Second, the European debt crisis, that started in Greece and extended to
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy, hit the Government Finance, namely deficit and
debt, which were covered in the EU fiscal convergence criteria. This crisis threatens
the whole European area, and perhaps the idea of the GMU. Thus GCC member
states need to consider this crisis seriously and take a step back in setting their fiscal
convergence criteria.
Third: The weakness of the fiscal discipline and fiscal harmonizing in the EU
and the political role in this matter bring other challenges.
This paper will help the GCC member states to be on the right track and
redesign their fiscal convergence criteria by finding the most efficient strategies,not
the exact fiscal reference values. Moreover, I will advise some methods based on the
experience of the EU and GCC member states that will give the GMU fiscal
discipline and strong fiscal policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I briefly explain the
background of establishing the GMU, and I discuss the importance of the monetary
union for the GCC region. In Section 3, I go through the GMU Fiscal Convergence
Criteria and of those quoted from the EMU criteria to study their fulfillment in each
GCC member state. In Section 4, I discuss the reasons that make the GMU fiscal
criteria not suitable forthe GCC economiesby clarifying the economic differences
between the GCC region and the EU. Section 6is considered the heart of this paper. In
this section, I show the real evidence of inadequacy of the GCC fiscal criteria for the
GCC economies and find appropriate strategies to adopt for the GMU fiscal criteria
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by studying the GCC economies fiscal data and by learning from the EU and the
GCC member state’ experiences discussed in previous sections. Section 7 is the
conclusion.

3

2- BRIEF BACKGROUND
In the 32nd Gulf Cooperation Council Supreme Meeting held December 19,
2011, Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah proposed that GCC member states should move
from cooperation stage toward union stage, namely confederation. That means that
they would coordinate and deal---as a group--with critical issues such as defense,
foreign affairs, economic integration, and a monetary union. The GCC formed a
specialized committee to study the proposal and give its feedback. In the wake of this
decision, urgent appeals have been growing in Saudi and Bahrain to move toward
Saudi-Bahrain confederation.
But in fact, this is not the first time that the GCC member states have raised
appeals for unity. According to Article 4 in the Cooperation Council Charter, the first
objective of the GCC is "To effect coordination, integration and inter-connection
between member states in all fields in order to achieve unity between them," and the
second objective is “To formulate similar regulations in various fields including
economic and financial affairs, commerce, customs and communications, education
and culture."
Regarding the coordination of economic affairs, the GCC Unified Economic
Agreement was provided in November 1981, shortly after the creation of the GCC, to
achieve a goal of full economic integration. Article 22 in this agreement states that
“Member states shall seek to coordinate their financial, monetary and banking
policies and enhance cooperation between monetary agencies and central banks,
including the endeavor to establish a joint currency in order to further their desired
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economic integration.”1 In 2001, GCC leaders went further by updating the GCC
Economic Agreement. They agreed to create a customs union, a common market, and
a monetary union. They scheduled these goals and determined the fiscal and
monetary convergence criteria to achieve the economic and monetary union. They
also agreed on other important economics and financial affairs.
Although GCC member states have made significant progress such as
launching the custom union in 2003 and common market in 2008, they may be
accused of not being serious in their efforts toward monetary union (common
currency area) and then achieving the full economic integration. For instance, the
UAE (the second largest economy in the region) has withdrawn from the monetary
because of the disagreement about the location of the GCC Central Bank (located in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). Oman, also has withdrawn due to its disability to meet some
of the scheduled criteria at the target date. The withdrawal of these two important
members (out of six GCC members) could make it difficult for the rest of the GCC
member states to create the monetary union. Another example is that all GCC
member states peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar, but Kuwait transformed to peg
its currency to a basket of major currencies.This lack of unity shows the weakness in
political harmony between the GCC member states and may affect the exchange rate
convergence criteria. The last example is that the GCC member states agreed to form
a monetary union and to adopt a common currency by 2010. The due date has passed,
and there is no clear timetable,nor a formal plan, for the forming of such a union.

1

For further details about the GCC history, documents, and the GCC Unified Economic Agreement,
visit GCC Secretariat web-site at: www.gcc.sg.org
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In addition, the GCC member states, due to the high dependency on oil and
gas, are facing specific challenges that oil prices are volatile,and oil and gas are
exhaustible. Moreover, theyare facing other challenges that threaten the idea of a
GCC monetary union. The more significant one is the debt crisis in Europe. Recent
events in Europe, particularly intermittent debt crises and the need for bailouts of
several EU members, have led some to question the wisdom of a common currency
across diverse economies, creating even more uncertainty about the future of a single
GCC currency (Shediac et al., 2011).
In research on the GCC economic integration, I determined the feasibility of
the monetary union for the GCC member states by combating its benefits and costs on
the GCC region. Some results of evaluating the feasibility show that the GMU, on
one hand, would eliminate uncertainties of exchange rate movements in the market,
foreign exchange costs of intraregional transaction, and speculative capital flows
within the region. The GMU, also, would increase competition, levels of intraregional
trade, investment and growth. Furthermore, the fiscal discipline due to the unified
monetary union policies would result a lower inflation and interest rate in the region.
On the other hand, joining the monetary union (MU) may bring in some costs such as
loss of independent control over monetary and fiscal policies of the individual
members. Another cost is that imbalances in any member of the region may cause
loss of union credibility, and /or facing negative direct /indirect macroeconomic
effects. What has happened in the EU due to the crisis in Greece and other EU
members may happen in the GCC. In general, I can say that the advantages of the
MU for the GCC region exceed the disadvantages.
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Although the GCC economic researchers spent a lot of effort to justify the
importance of the MU for the GCC region, The GMU will certainly be established
due to the region’s political will and the need tosurvive. As well as the case for the
EU2, the political events were the main motivation that stimulated the GCC leaders to
move toward the GCC integration and to achieve the regional unity. Historically,
theGCC Council was created in 1981, to confront the regional conflict of Iran-Iraq
war, and because of the fear of the Iranian revolution export.
In 1990, the concept of unity was again raised because of the occupation of
Kuwait by Iraq which threatened the survival of the GCC monarchies. Recently
(2011/2012), the surrounding political turmoil of Arab revolution (Arab spring),
especially in Bahrain, and the Iranian threats and interventions led the GCC member
states to consider unity once more. These challenges have also created other
proposals such as adding Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies to the union.
The GCC Monetary Union (GMU), if it is created, could be the second most
important supranational monetary union in the world after the EMU. In addition to its
political importance, the GMU could benefit its own countries, Arab and Muslim
countries in general that may qualify it to play a leading role in the world. Thus,the
main goal for the GCC member states is to enhance the integration and interconnection between them in all fields toward the achievement of the unity.
Coordination of the economic affairs and the economic integration are the most

2

(Georgios Kouretas, 2010) indicate that "One should not forget that the euro project seems to be
mostly a political construction and not an economic one". (Loukas Tsoukalis, 2010) also indicates that
"Economic and monetary union was the offspring of the Franco-German couple, President Mitterrand
and Chancellor Kohl to be precise. It was about high politics and peace on the continent, much less so
about economics.”

7

important roles toward this goal, and the monetary union is considered as the last
building block of economic integration among the GCC member states.
The question should not be asked about the wisdom of the monetary union for
the GCC region’s member states, but how could they create anefficient one. They
have to be careful and more serious in developing their economic policies and
strategy. They also needtest carefullytheir readiness to achieve this goal. Moreover,
they should knowhow to benefit from the experiences of similar unions like the EMU
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3-THE GMU FISCAL CONVERGENCE CRITERIA
(Following the EMU footsteps)
The GMU fiscal convergence criteria--namely public deficit and debt
reference values–have beenliterally quoted from the EMU convergence criteria
(Maastricht Convergence Criteria)whichis considered as the most important step
toward European Monetary Union and the adoption of the Euro. Maastricht
Convergence Criteria, addressed in Article 121 ofthe Maastricht Treaty (1991/92),
were designed to measure the readiness of the European countries to join the union
and required to be fulfilled by the potential candidates.
3-1- Fiscal Convergence Criteria
Maastricht Convergence Criteria can be divided into two fiscal and monetary
convergence criteria. The fiscal convergence criteria which this paper is concerned
about are:
Government Deficit: The annual government budgetary deficit ratio to the gross
domestic product (GDP) should not exceed 3% at the end of the previous fiscal year
(except in exceptional and temporary cases).
Government Debt: The gross government debt ratio (public debt ratio) to the gross
domestic product (GDP) should not exceed 60% at the end of the previous fiscal year.
If the target ratio cannot be achieved for specific reasons, it should approach the
reference value with satisfactory speed.
3-2- Fulfillment of the Fiscal Convergence Criteria
Indeed, unlike the European case, the GCC member states have not just
achieved the fiscal convergence criteria, but have considerably surpassed them.
Regarding the government deficit criterion, table 1 below shows that rather than
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being around the reference deficit value (3%), the GCC member states (except
Bahrain) have achieved budget surpluses. Bahrain, though, may face some problems
in the future due to the difference ratio between its budgetary deficit ratio and the rest
of the GCC member states. In terms of public debt criterion, we can see that all the
GCC member states have a low public debt ratio to the GDP. Bahrain and Qatar have
higher debt ratios compared to the other, but still they are considerably lower than the
reference debt value (60%).

Table 1: Fulfillment of the fiscal convergence criteria for GMU member
states in 20113

Public
Deficit
(%GDP)
Public
Debt
(%GDP)

Saudi
Arabia

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

-2.287

31.04

9.815

7.761

15.231

11.023

7.348

5.055

31.477

7.524

16.889

36.456

Emirates

Overall, it can be concluded that all the GCC member states are eligible to join the
GMU in terms of Fulfillment Fiscal Convergence Criteria due to their compliance
with them.

3

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2012.
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Visit the European Union website at www.europa.eu and the European Central Bank at
www.ecb.intfor further information about the (EMU).

10

4-WHY THE EMU FISCAL CONVERGENCE CRITERIA ARE NOT
APPROPRITE FOR THE GMU?
The European Monetary Union (EMU)4, also called the Eurozone area, is the
most important supranational monetary union in the world. It represents the biggest
economic integration step in the EU by adopting a common currency (the Euro) and
applying a single monetary policy controlled by the ECB.5 The EMU, due to its
precedence and superiority, could be a good realistic model for the GCC member
states as they are establishing their own GMU. The GCC member states can study
and learn from the EMU experience about how to create the monetary union and how
to coordinate the economic policies to set the required convergence criteria toward a
successful monetary union. Moreover, they can benefit from the useful ideas from the
EMU to confront the challenges that the GMU may face. However, the GCC member
states should not have the exact fiscal criteria, and they have, instead, to show more
seriousness designing their own criteria that go with their macroeconomic index.
There are many reasons that support this argument. Some of interesting points
showing bellow:
4-1- The differences of economybetween the EU and the GCC region
It is worth mentioning that study of the EU and other experiences in dealing with
the GMU project will save time and effort, and will help to avoid similar problems
that they are facing. However, the adoption of a cut-and-paste strategy is considered
as one of the main reasons that threaten the establishment or success of the
GMUproject.The GCC member states seem to not take the fundamental differences

5

The European Central Bank.
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between themselves and the EU into account when they set up the fiscal convergence
criteria. Some of these differences are shown below:
•

With a combined population of 45.9 million inhabitants, the GCC region as a
whole is considered as one of the most powerful economics in the world because
it has the largest oil reserves and produces an aggregate GDP of 1.37 trillion
U.S.dollars6. However, the economy of its six member states together is not
strictly comparable, which consists of 17 out of 27 of the EU countries with a
combined population of over 500 million inhabitants, and an aggregate of the
largest nominal world gross domestic product (GDP) of over 12 trillion U.S.
dollars.7 The EU representsapproximately 20% of the globalGDPand
includeseconomies that are considered among the largest advanced economies
and some of the most credible and powerful ones. So, it is not reasonable that the
GCC member states rely on the same exact fiscal policies reference values as the
EUM ones.

•

The economic structure of the GCC region does notdefinitely match the EU one,
thus the economic performanceand policies of the GMU have to correlate with its
memberstates’ economic structure. The GCC member states need tounderstand
that the causes and consequences of fluctuation in their GDP and the determinants
of their economic growth are totally different than the ones that the EU is facing.
The EU relies on heavy manufacturing sectors and high levels of diversification.
In contrast, GCC region highly depends on rich natural resources in oil, gas, and
the activities related to those resources. Laabas and Limam (2002) mention that
6

7

Source: www.gcc.sg.org

World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012 - International Monetary Fund.
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“Despite many efforts at diversifying their economies, GCC countries remain
heavily dependent on oil. On average oil represents more than 80 percent of
export receipts and budget revenues, respectively.”Thisinformation means a low
level of diversification and higher vulnerability for the GCC region to external
shocks. Therefore, since oil and gas play an extremely important role in the GCC,
member countries have consciously taken steps to diversify their economies as
they look at other sectors of the economy such as tourism, manufacturing and
banking (Abdelghani et al., 2011).
•

Unlike the EU case, high dependency on oil reduces the differences among the
GCC member states on their economic structure. However, Sturm and Siegfried
(2006) indicate that, “Both the pace and direction of economic diversification will
probably differ in the future between GCC member states, and will thus reduce
the structural similarities between their economies.” Subsequently, the GCC
member states’economic forecasts and models (fiscal policies in our case) have to
rely on their economics indexes.

•

Regarding the EU fiscal convergence criteria, the big question we should ask is:
Why does the EU set a deficit reference value of 3% and debt reference value of
60%? “P. De Grauwe emphasizes that in the 1990s, in the EU countries the
average valueof the public debt share in GDP may have been at the level of 60%
and that was thereason why this value was adopted as a reference index.”8 In
accordancewith the economic studies in Germany, the achievement of this value
requires the deficit reverence value to not exceed 3%.Bukowski (2006) indicates

8

Slawomir Bukowski, 2006, “The Maastricht Convergence Criteria and Economic Growth in the EMU.”
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that “These values were adopted due to the insistence of Germany. They were to
prevent the situation in which the excessive growth of budget deficits and public
debt would not lead to an increase in interest rates in the entire Union’s area to the
detriment of the countries of lower interest rates at the moment the Union was
created. Germany was among those countries.” So what if Germany was not
among these countries? Are the EU members going to set different strategies such
as balance or surplus strategies rather than a deficit one?
This argument leads us to ask the GCC member states the same realistic
question that we asked before: Why do they set a deficit reference value of 3% and
debt reference value of 60%?
4-2- The EU debt crisis: (Large public deficit and debt)
The European debt crisis that started in Greece and extended to Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, and Italy, threatens the whole Euro area, and perhaps the idea of the
GMU. The European leaders, at the beginning, did not realize the risk that this crisis
may cause and did not take the right action to stop it. Nowadays, they have found that
the problem is going deeper and deeper, and the risk that the whole Euro area will be
harmed is fairly high. EU leaders' responses are yet to stop it.
Many researchers have been trying to determine the causes of the crises to
help the EU members create an appropriate solution. They have found that the large
ratio of sovereign debt in Greece and other affected European countries that occurred
from annual accumulation of consecutive fiscal deficits are the most influential
reason that led to the European debt crisis.Kouretas (2010) claimed that "The public
deficits in conjunction with declining external competitiveness played a decisive role
on the deteriorating fiscal stance of the Greek economy.” The Greek government
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actually failed to meet its intertemporal budget constraints and that led its public debt
to reach unsustainable levels in the long-run.
In the case of economic and monetary unions such as the EU for instance, the
unsustainable debt position maybe fatal for the whole union, in the sense that the
continuing increases in debt of a given country will push the other member countries
to implement deflationary policies (Abdelghani et al., 2011). Economic experts have
warned that the Greek debt crisis may become a prelude to the sovereign debt spread
everywhere. In fact, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy are suffering from permanent
budget default right now and that will affect the union badly if they do not take the
right action.
The European crisis concentrated in the Government finance issues (debt and
deficit) and that means one or both of the two scenarios can be: either the Europeanaffected countries did not fulfill the fiscal convergence criteria or thefiscal discipline
(fiscal stabilization) for the affected members was insufficient which means that the
EMU needs to be supported by better fiscal policy framework. Indeed, the both
scenarios were showing. Some European countries had problems with meeting fiscal
convergence criteria at the time of joining the EMU. For instance, Herz and Kotios
(2000) found thatin the reference year 1999 of Greece entry to the EMU, "The debt
ratio was 104.4%, well above the 60% reference value (but below the debt ratio of the
EMU members Italy and Belgium). As the debt ratio has been declining since 1997,
the European Council (ECOFIN) made the decision in November 1999 that Greece
does not have an "excessive deficit" and is therefore in compliance with the public
finance criterion."
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However, unfulfillment of the fiscal criteria is not the only reason that caused
the crisis. For instance, some irresponsible countries that have a poor management of
public finances have spent too much and borrowed too much taking advantage of
being part of the union that included strong economies like France and Germany.
They ended up having too much debt relative to their economies then failed to
generate enough economic growth to make their payment (fiscal undisciplined).
Studying the Greek case, Kouretas (2010) pointed out that "Increased public
expenditure in recent years led to dramatic increase in borrowing requirements and
high levels of accumulated public debt."
In an attempt to mitigate the effects of the crisis, the EU decided to buy
consistent amounts of government bonds as a last resort. Greece too proceeded to
implement the policy of austerity in order to reduce the level of government
expenditure. Furthermore, economists advised some proposals to mitigate the effects
of the crisis or at least help the EU to avoid a similar one. Kouretas (2010) argued
that "the solution to the Greek problem in the long run would be to redesign its
economic and fiscal policies." In a different perspective, Ngai (2012) said that "a
permanent solution to the debt crisis may not perhaps come through fiscal policy
constraints, but perhaps through “Eurobonds” or fiscal union that allows for large
transfers between countries." There are many ideas similar to these that have been
mentioned in different ways.
Although GCC member states have fulfilled the fiscal convergent criteria,
they need to consider this crisis seriously, and take a step back in the development
ofeconomic integration strategiespreciselyin the government finance issues.
Indeed,they have to spend more effort adopting deficit and debt reference values
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when they redesign their fiscal convergence criteria to avoid a similar crisis.
Moreover,GCC member states must take the government expenditure issue into
account in designing of the GMU fiscal convergence criteria due to its obvious
influence on the doubling of the crisis.
4-3-The weakness of fiscal disciplineand fiscal harmony in the EMU
(The role of political intervention)
The fiscal convergences criteria have been imposed on the EMU to achieve
the fiscal discipline and fiscal stability in every member states and ensure the fiscal
harmonizing (coordination) among them by creating compatible fiscal policies and
preventing or reducing the political intervention in the union.However,the realitydid
notalignwiththe objective of the fiscal criteria. Many researchers blame the EU crisis
on the weakness of fiscal discipline and the lack of harmonizing its policies and
mechanisms.Despite high-level commitments, the original sin of the crisis laid in the
decision to harmonies monetary policies without harmonizing or strengthening
Eurozone fiscal policies (Valiante, 2011). The Eurozone needs stronger and common
regulatory mechanisms for financial markets (Tsoukalis, 2010). In general, Kouretas
(2010) claimed that "The current debt crisis have shown that a reform of current EU
mechanisms must be put inforce, otherwise the stability of the Eurozone will be
jeopardized and the euro currency itself will be negatively affected."
It is commonly known that political objectives are not quite convergent with
economic ones (Bukowski, 2006). Thus, there is no doubt that the European political
intervention, conflicts, mismanagement, and the lack of credibility contributed

significantly and directly in reducing the level of fiscal discipline in the union.Cline
(2011) indicates that the European sovereign debt crisis is a crisis of confidence. The
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political conflicts and interventions have had the largest influence that caused the
union mismanagement and led to the lack of credibility, and thus the crisis of
confidence.
There is much evidence to support this argument. For instance, Loukas (2010)
mentioned that "observers have suddenly discovered that Greek governments hadbeen
(shall we say?) economical with the truth and flexible about the way they handled
statistics. They are also finding out that international banks had helped to camouflage
public debt." Another example is what I mentioned in the previous section about the
European Council that decidedto accept Greece as a member of the EMU even
though it had an excessive debt ratio.
Italy9 also was not eligible to meet the fiscal convergence criteria, but the
EMU members were unable to exclude it from the union due to its political
importance.Last, but not least, are the irresponsible expenditure and borrowing
policies that some affected countries have adopted taking advantage of being a
member of the European Union.
Although the establishment of the EMU has been based on the guarantees of
stronger countries such as Germany and France, the political conflicts,
mismanagement, and the lack of credibility may influence negatively on these
guarantees and reflect on market prices; therefore, leading them to withdraw capital
and investments to other regional areas of the global economy that will compounding
the problem. Most of the EU crisis research focused on reducing the authority of the
regional institute on the union economic decisions and creating supranational

9

This information translated from an Arabic recourse: Lamis Farahat (Elaphnewspaper), 2012 :
Secret government documents lights on the disadvantages of the euro.
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institutions that handled the economic issues in the union. Lavrač (2004) noted that
"In contrast to monetary policy, fiscal policy remains in the hands of the member
states, but it should be limited by the common EU institutions, so that overexpansionary national fiscal policies would not spill over into negative consequences
for the single monetary policy and stability of the single currency."
As I mentioned earlier in the background section, the decision of the GMU
was made due to political will and the need of improvement and survival. However,
politicalintervention,conflicts, and the desire to control and influence on economic
policies, as what it shown in the European case, were the most important reasons that
caused the union mismanagement and led to the lack of credibility, thus the crisis of
confidence.The ball is now in the court ofGCC leaders. They need to submit
supranational and strict fiscal policies that cannot be exceeded, and reach political
compromise among their countries to achieve the goal of closer fiscal integration and
strong monetary union or monopolize the decisions and face theweakness of fiscal
and probability of fiscal crisis as the EMU did.
All of these reasons above answer this section’s question. So, the GCC
member states should redesign their fiscal convergence criteria taking into account
the economic differences, EU crises, and the political role on the fiscal discipline and
fiscal harmonizing.

19

5- DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE TO SHOCKS OF GCC AND EU
ECONOMIES
(Practical evidence)
The message from the discussion above is that monetary union criteria
adopted in the EU countries are not applicable to GCC. I argue that higher
dependence on the oil sector in the GCC member states was one of the most
significant reasons.I conjecture that unlike the EU, the common shocks hitting GCC
economies are shocks to oil prices. Next, I further investigate the relationship
between oil prices and GDP in GCC versus EU countries.In particular, I first look at
how Log GDP per capita responds to oil prices. Since GDP might have a trend, I
include a linear trend in the GCC regression.
Formally, I estimate the following relation for each of six GCC countries:
Log GDPi,t=a + C t + b Log Oil Pricei,t + ei,t
Table 2below shows estimation results. Increases in oil price are associated with
higher GDP in most GCC countries. The highest effects are observed for Bahrain and
Qatar. Table 3 presents the estimates of the same regression for some EU countries
and Russia. I selected France and Germanybecause they are considered thelargest
advanced economies in the EU and the world. Greece and Italy, on the other hand,
were selected for being among the EU members hardest hit by the debt crisis.Russia,
in contrast, matched the EU economy structure; at the same time, it is considered as
one of the important natural gas exporters.
The relation between oil price and GDP is completely different in EU: larger
prices are associated with GDP going below the trend. Russian GDP seems, on the
other hand, to go above the trend as for GCC countries.
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I also looked at the relationship between GDP growth rate and oil prices
byestimating the following equation:
DLogGDPi,t=a + b Log Oil Pricei,t + ei,t
Here,Dlog GPD is the difference between t+1 and t log of GDP. By looking at table 4
and table 5, clearly there is a differential impact of oil prices on oil exporters and nonoil exporters. EU countries’ growth rates respond negatively to higher oil prices,
whereas GCC and Russian GDP seem to grow faster when oil prices are high.

Table:2Level of GDP and Oil Price: GCC members: Detrended
(7)
log_gdp

(8)
log_gdp

(9)
log_gdp

(10)
log_gdp

(11)
log_gdp

(12)
log_gdp

0.149***
(0.040)
0.001
(0.003)

-0.046
(0.090)
0.026***
(0.008)

0.082***
(0.020)
-0.001
(0.002)

8.312
(6.361)

-42.220**
(15.334)

0.233**
(0.084)
0.025***
(0.006)
39.597***
(12.532)

0.067*
(0.037)
0.007*
(0.004)

Constant

0.038
(0.030)
0.016***
(0.002)
22.535***
(3.778)

-5.037
(7.212)

13.401***
(3.479)

Observation
R-squared

28
0.538

24
0.608

28
0.873

24
0.866

24
0.678

VARIABLES
log_price
Year

24
0.629
United
Saudi
Arab
Country
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Arabia
Emirates
Trend in
Trend in
Trend in
Trend in
Trend in
Trend in
Notes
GDP
GDP
GDP
GDP
GDP
GDP
Notes: Sample includes GCC countries for the years 1982-2009. Standard errors robust to
heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3: Log of GDP and Oil price: EU and Russia: Detrended

VARIABLES
log_price
Year
Constant

(6)
log_gdp

(7)
log_gdp

(8)
log_gdp

(9)
log_gdp

(10)
log_gdp

-0.012
(0.007)
0.016***
(0.001)
-20.732***
(1.095)

-0.039***
(0.011)
0.018***
(0.001)
-25.477***
(1.280)

0.108***
(0.014)
0.018***
(0.001)
-25.513***
(1.374)

-0.062***
(0.012)
0.018***
(0.001)
-25.278***
(1.804)

0.517***
(0.065)
-0.017**
(0.008)
40.826**
(14.822)

Observations
R-squared
Country

28
28
28
28
20
0.971
0.965
0.968
0.947
0.839
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Russia
Trend in
Trend in
Trend in
Trend in
Trend in
GDP
GDP
GDP
GDP
GDP
Notes
Notes: Sample includes some EU countries and Russia for the years 1982-2009 (Russia
after 1991). Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis.
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Table 4: Growth in GDP and Oil Price: GCC members

VARIABLES
log_price
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(13)
Dlog_gdp

(14)
Dlog_gdp

(15)
Dlog_gdp

(16)
Dlog_gdp

(17)
Dlog_gdp

(18)
Dlog_gdp

0.000
(0.017)
-0.006
(0.053)

-0.018
(0.034)
0.077
(0.121)

0.035*
(0.019)
-0.090
(0.061)

0.064**
(0.027)
-0.164*
(0.093)

0.017
(0.016)
-0.044
(0.058)

0.009
(0.016)
-0.028
(0.054)

28
0.000

23
0.006

28
0.111

23
0.183

23
0.028

23
0.012
United
Saudi
Arab
Country
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Arabia
Emirates
Notes
None
None
None
None
None
None
Notes: Sample includes GCC countries for the years 1982-2009. Standard errors robust to
heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5: Growth in GDP and Oil Price: EU and Russia

VARIABLES
log_price
Constant

(11)
Dlog_gdp

(12)
Dlog_gdp

(13)
Dlog_gdp

(14)
Dlog_gdp

(15)
Dlog_gdp

-0.013*
(0.006)
0.055**
(0.020)

-0.007
(0.009)
0.036
(0.028)

-0.005
(0.011)
0.034
(0.034)

-0.021**
(0.009)
0.079***
(0.027)

0.073***
(0.023)
-0.233**
(0.081)

Observations
28
28
28
28
19
R-squared
0.174
0.029
0.010
0.236
0.275
Country
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Russia
Notes
None
None
None
None
None
Notes: Sample includes some EU countries and Russia for the years 1982-2009 (Russia after
1991). Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and
* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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6- APPROPRIATE STRATEGIES ADOPTING THEGMU FISCAL
CRITERIA
Although all the GCC member states fulfill the fiscal convergence criteria-namely public debt and deficit criteria literally quoted from the EMU, they should
take into account all the differences between their region and the EU-mentioned
earlier--redesigning the GMU fiscal convergence criteria. They, indeed, have tospend
more effort finding the right fiscal strategies that fit their economic index. The main
goal here is to help the GCC member states to be on the right track and redesign their
fiscal convergence criteria by finding the most efficient strategies,not the exact fiscal
reference values. Precisely, I want to help them to find the most suited government
finance strategies rather than the debt and deficit ones they have.Moreover, I want to
add more fiscal criteria that relates to the government budgetary which is considered
asa fundamental motive to government finance. The issues
thatwillbediscussedinthisregard are arranged as follows:
6-1: First issue: Provide appropriate government finance strategies
The reference debt and deficit values in the GCC fiscal convergence criteria
are literally quoted from the EMU criteria. It is understandable that the EMU fiscal
convergent is on default strategy due to its members’ deficit budgetary situation as I
mentioned earlier, but the question can be raised here is: why the GCC countries
chose the same strategy while they have a budget surplus now? And why do they set a
debt reference value of 60%?
Going further, by analyzing the GCC member states’ budgetary situation,
chart 1 in the next page shows thatsince 1999, the GCC member states (expect
Bahrain and Oman in 2002 and 2008, and Saudi Arabia in 2008) have been
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experiencing budget surplus. The case of Oman and Saudi Arabia in 2002 and 2008,
respectively, could be acceptable as they coincided with the global economic crisis.
Nevertheless, all GCC member states (even Bahrain) have not been going beyond
reference deficit value (3%). Moreover, in regard to public debt, chart 2 shows that
A\although Saudi Arabia and Qatar had very high public debt levels around 1999,
since that time, the ratio of public debt to the GDP in all the GCC member states had
been decreasing steadily until 2008. While there was a subsequent increase again
after the global economic crisis in 2008, they still have remained at low levels below
the reference debt value (60%).
This analysis shows that the fiscal convergent criteria did not fit the GCC'
economics condition and did not depend on GCC economies index. Moreover, these
criteria require economic conditions lower than what the GCC country already
achieved which will not encourage them to spend any effort to generate economic
growth, as well as, improve the union in general. That in the end may lead to a fiscal
problem.
Here, I am not going to give the exact reference values that the GCC should
adopt. I recommend them to set a surplus and low debt level strategies rather than the
government finance strategies they have. The economists inthe GCC member states
have to work on providing appropriate reference valuesthat work with their
economies.
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Chart 1: General public gross
surplus/deficit % of the GDP for the GCC
members (1999-2011)
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Chart 2: General public gross debt % of the
GDP for the GCC members (1999-2011)
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* Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2012.
* I chose the period (1999-2011) Based on available data10.
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There is a lack of data in some countries before 1999.
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6-2 The second issue: Additional fiscal criteria
(Government budgetary: revenueandexpenditure)
Fiscal policy depends on government budgets. More specific, it depends on the
government’s adjustment of its revenue and expenditure (spending) in order to
influence a nation’s economy. Deficit/surplus levels, therefore, as well as the debt
levels, are actually the effects of government influence on the nation’s economy by
increasing or decreasing the level of its revenue and expenditure. However, neither
the EU nor the GMU have leaned on the government revenue and expenditure levels
when they set up the Monetary Union Fiscal Convergence Criteria and they are
content with government finance strategies only. So the big question here is: Should
we add the government revenueand government expenditure to the GMU fiscal
convergence criteria?
6-2-1 Government Revenue
Government revenue in any country, in general, depends on taxation or nontax revenues such as revenues from sovereign wealth funds, government-owned
corporations, government services fees, aid, etc. However, governments from all the
GCC member states depend on rich natural resources in oil, gas and the activities
related to these resources as main sources of their revenue. The data from 2001 to
2011, in chart 3 ensures this fact. It is evident that oil and gas revenues have
contributed massive levels to total governments’ revenues in all GCC member states
(even Qatar which has the lowest level compared to the rest). Oil and gas revenues
reach high levels (70%) in most of the GCC member states. Since 2004, Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia haveattained a fabulous level (90%). The UAE, Oman, and Bahrain did
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not go lower than (65%). The lowest level was around (45%) in 2009, reached by
Qatar and still considered high.
Due to the high dependency on oil and gas revenues, the GCC member states are
facing specific challenges that oil prices are volatile (short-term challenges) and oil
and gas– natural resources--are exhaustible (long-term challenges). Oil reserves have
the following expected depletion dates: Saudi Arabia, 2110; Bahrain, 2011; UAE,
2110; Oman, 2022; Kuwait, 2121; and Qatar, 2049 (Alyafai, 2012). Therefore, the
question we should ask is what is going to happen if the oil and gas run out or the
price of them goes down sharply (oil price shock)?

Chart 3: Oil & Gas Revenue % of Total
Government Revenue (2001-2011)
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* Source: Arab Monetary Fund & GCC member states National Authorities11.
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Ministries of Economy and Finance in all GCC member states.
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There is no doubt that the GCC member states must take this issue into
account in the design of the GMU fiscal convergence criteria even though it would be
difficult for them to set a specific oil revenue reference value due to the global
importance of oil sector which is strongly influenced by global markets’ volatile
demands and prices. It would be easier, instead, to set a specific reference value of oil
and gas sector share of the total GDP of GCC member states. Chart 4 presents the
high levels of oil and gas sectors in all of the GCC member states, except for Bahrain
and the UAE, which exceeded (40%) after 2004. It also presents the volatility of oil
and gas shares that clearly presented in 2009!
The idea of oil and gas share reference value is to maintain lowlevels
ofconvergentandstable oil and gas sector share between and within the GCC member
states.In other words, obligate GCC member states to raise the level of the non-oil
sector share to the GDP, which pushes them for economic diversification (increase
the degree of commodity diversification). Diversification at the end will lead to
greater market openness, higher involvement of the private sector, such as the
industrial sector, in the GCC economies which have very limited scale of
diversification. In addition, it will create new jobs, and create and improve fiscal
policies such as taxation policies. Itwill, in general, push up the GCC member states’
economic growth.
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Ratio of the GDP

Chart 4: Oil & Gas Sector Share % of GDP
(2001-2011)
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As a result, the government burdens (expenditure), such as salaries of
governmentjobs which is considered as the major burden on government expenditures
inGCC economies,14 will decrease, thus the non-oil and gas revenues will contribute
higher levels to total governments’ revenues.
6-2-2 Government Expenditure
The Maastricht Convergence Criteria provided countries such as Italy and Greece
with the incentive to cut down on their public expenditures and debt levels in order to
meet the criteria for entering the Euro (Ngai, 2012). However, these criteria were not a

sufficient deterrent in controlling irrational spending policies in the affected European
countries, which in turn were the cause of the EU debt crisis in line with the other

12

Bahrain – Central Informatics Organization, Qatar- Statistic Authority, Saudi Arabia – Central
Department of Statistical & Information, ministries of Economy and Finance in the UAE, and Arab
Monetary Fund.
13
There is a lack of oil sector information, and there are some differences on oil share % data
depending on the source. I did not find the data of oil sector for Kuwait in 2011, Oman in (2010,
2011), and the UAE in 2011.
14

Arab Monetary Fund.
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reasons mentioned earlier. In the GMU case, moreover,the government expenditure
growth in all of the GCC member states tends to go sharply with the oil price cycles
due to the high dependency of government budgets on the oil sector. Thus, unlike the
European case, controlling the spending policies will not be an issue nowadays due to
the high oil revenues. However, that may cause unbalanced spending policies once
the oil revenues decline! It would be too difficult for the GCC member states to
reduce their government’s expenditure levels at that time, which leads to higher levels
of deficit and debt.
The data of the GCC governments’ expenditures from 1999 to 2011, presented
in chart 5 shows that the level of government expenditure is not stable in each
country. It is clear that the expenditure levels and levels of oil and gas revenues
shown above tend to move in parallel, which basically confirms the fear of
unbalanced spending policies if oil prices declined sharply for any reason. In addition,
chart 5 also shows the big disparity in the spending levels between the GCC member
states. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example, have reached the highest level of
government expenditure (60% of Kuwait’s GDP in 1999, 60% of Saudi’s GDP in
2009) while the UAE has maintained the lowest level among the GCC member states.
The increased instability and disparity of government expenditure levels in and
among GCC member states will create a good atmosphere for irrational spending
policies, and will increase the risk that any imbalances in spending policies in any
member will affect the rest of the union member states. The idea here is to set a
government expenditure reference value to maintain lowconvergentandstable
government expenditure levels between and within the GCC member states.
Therefore, that goal will rationalize the spending policies, decrease the potential risk
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of oil price shocks, and it will obligate GCC governments to find alternative sectors
to share their burdens with. In addition, it will have positive effects on monetary
policies such as maintain or decrease the level of inflation in GCC member states.

Chart 5: General Government Total
expenditure % of GDP (1999-2011)
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6-2-3 Oil price influence (real evidence); Oil price shock(2008-2009 recession)15
I mentioned earlier that GCC governments’ revenues have a high dependency
on oil and gas sector and their expenditure levels move in parallel with levels of oil
and gas revenues. This means that oil price shock may cause unbalanced revenues
levels and unmanageable fiscal policies in the GCC member states which leads them
to enter a recession. From recent past experience, chart 6 indicates that the price of oil
hasincreased gradually since 2001 until it reached the highest level ever (100$/barrel)
in mid-2008. That explains the budget surplus situations (chart 1) in all GCC member
15

Source: Timothy Siegel, “Why Oil Prices Rose in the Spring of 2008 and Will Rise Again;” Tverberg,
Gail, “Why Low Oil Prices Indicate the World is Heading for a Recession;" “Rising Oil Prices:2008 All
over again?” (White papers, 2012 Conway Wealth Group).”
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states except Bahrain—thestate
thestate with the lowest oil reserves--and
and the gradual decrease
d
in their debt levels untill they reach the lowest level in 2008 (chart 2). The biggest
big
issue here is that international oil supply was not enough against high international oil
demand, especially in China which gained higher oil consuming power at the expense
of global markets that led to massive price rises. What happened in late 2008?
Many countries
ries in the world suffered a recession due to several economic
reasons such as the mortgage crisis, downfall in valuations and liquidity, rising oil
prices, and their oil demand ha
has decreased as well. As a result,, oil prices dropped
sharply from 100$/barrell to around 60$/barrel in 2009 as shown in chart 6. The big
question here is what happened to the GCC member states?

Chart 6:: Annual Average Crude Oil Spot
Price (2000-2011)

* Source: EIA (Energy Information Administration)
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In chart 1, from 2007 to 2008, the budget surplus in Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Oman, and Bahrain have reached the highest levels; these countries (from 2008to
2009) then faced a sharp decline in their budgets, going to deficit levels. Qatar’s
budget surplus remained stable from 2007 to 2009 and increased slightly from 2008
to 2009, while Kuwait has faced a big decrease in its budget surplus from 2007 to
2008, then increased again from 2008 to 2009. Charts 3,4, and 5 could explain what
happened.
The huge increase then decrease of oil price in 2008 was a turning point in the
GCC economies. The high oil prices led to increased oil sector share in all GCC
member states. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Bahrain took advantage of this
increase and raised their government expenditures (unmanageable fiscal policies),
which led them to difficulty in bearing the burdens when under budget deficits when
oil prices dropped sharply in 2009. Kuwait and Qatar were safe. In fact, their budgets
got higher in 2008. Kuwait was more rational than the rest of the countries dealing
with the high oil prices in 2008, thus its government expenditure was stable from
2008 to 2009. Qatar, on the other hand, increased its government expenditure at that
time, but due to the decreasing policies on the oil revenues to the total government
revenues that it determined, Qatar maintained on budget surplus levels. Chart 6 shows
that oil prices increased again after 2009, which returned the GCC member states to a
budget surplus situation and saved them from entering a recession. The most
important question we should conclude with is: What was going to happen if the oil
price did not rise again???
Based on all of the above factors, I recommend that the GCC member states
should redesign their fiscal convergence criteria by adding the oil and gas sector share
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criterion and government expenditure. The GCC member states should provide
appropriate reference oil sector share and government expenditure values that should
not be exceeded. I believe that action will reduce the gap between the members with
regard to spending policies, increase the degree of economic diversification, increase
the investment, and activate the role of the private sector in the members’ economies.
Overall, these criteria will enhance the economic growth for the whole region.
In this regard, GCC member states can study and benefit from the case of the
UAE economy which is considered the second largest economy in the GCC region,
and has maintained the lowest government expenditure levels and the lowest oil
sector share among the GCC member states (except Bahrain). In addition, it has the
most stable debt level in the region.
6-3The third issue: Fiscal discipline andharmonizing
(Limit the role of politics)
As I mentioned earlier, the decision of the GMU was made due to political
will and the need to improve and survive. However, the political the influence,the
regional authority on fiscal policies, and the political conflictsurrounding these
countries as I mentioned in section 2 show a lack of seriousnessof the GCC member
states to achieve the GMU and may lead to the lack of credibility—thus, the crisis of
confidence.The ball is now in the court ofGCC leaders: either they submit to political
compromise and achieve the goal of closer fiscal integration and strong monetary
union or monopolize the decisions and face the probability of a crisis as the EMU
one. Learning from the literature review on the experience of the European political
landscape, I came up with several lessons that may help to set an optimal
management and increased union credibility, and therefore, achieve the goal.
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6-3-1 The first lesson: Promote a permanent fiscal criteria
Fiscal convergence criteria for the GCC member states were designed as
required criteria to join the GMU, but they also could play a useful role as permanent
criteria. This role can ensure sustainable fiscal convergence and help to avoid any
regional undisciplined fiscal policies that may lead to a crisis similar to the EMU one.
The debt data shown earlier in chart 2 indicates that the very different levels
of debt in Saudi Arabia, as an example, between 1999 and 2011, and between them
and the UAE debt levels present an unclear picture about the stability of fiscal public
policies, and underlines the importance of the continuance of the fiscal criteria. This
unclear picture warns of the possibility of increasing debt levels in the future after
joining the union due to the historical unstable fiscal policies, as well as to the
absence of policies that control and determine the behavior of GCC members
regarding the debt decision.
6-3-2 Thesecond lesson: Determine a strict timetable
GCC member states have to determine an exact timetable of GMU
establishment that cannot be manipulated. They have expended considerable effort to
achieve the GMU; however, they need to show seriousness in these efforts through a
set of scheduled steps and adopting a deadline to create the GMU. Moreover, they
should not rush to the establishment of the union. They also should provide that the
fulfillment of the convergence criteria, after re-evaluating them, is a condition that
cannot be waived for the potential GMU member. In other words, it is not necessary
for the six members to join the GMU at the same time while some of them do not
fulfill the criteria. The union should not tolerate any joining of the members that
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donot meet the criteria even if the target date has passed and whatever the political
desires and the circumstances.
6-3-3 Thethird lesson: Independence decision
Adopting independence decision-making mechanismsshould be considered as
one of the most important basic pillars that influence the credibility of the GCC, as
well as increasedeconomic and fiscal integration in the GMU. The economic decision
in the GCC region remains in the hands of national economic governments which
may cause political conflicts and mismanagement. Indeed, that is what actually
happened when Kuwait, for example, decided in 2007 to peg its currency to a basket
of international currencies while all national GCC members were pegged to the U.S.
dollar. The UAE too has withdrawn from the monetary union in 2009 because of the
disagreement about the location of the GCC Central Bank. Before achieving the
monetary union and adopting a common currency, GCC member states need to limit
the political influence by adopting different supranational institutions and agencies
under the GMU in a framework of multilateral surveillance that can set and improve
the harmonizing and/or standardizing fiscal and monetary policies, and help the union
to face any potential crisis.
These safeguards must be adoptedbecause institutions and agencies are
recognized as independent entities which are not subject to any influence by regional
government, and can be divided into several institutions. The first proposed
institution is the Gulf Monetary Fund (GMF) that will take the responsibility of
fostering the monetary cooperation, securing financial stability, facilitating
international trade, reducing the government deficits to keep GCC members from
running up large amounts of debt, and designing a well-established bailout plan. In
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addition, these safeguards will prevent a potential financial crisis thus avoiding a lack
of credibility. In the Greek debt crisis case, Germany and other Euro nations urged
Greece not to go to the IMF for a bailout loan. Such a possibility is widely seen as
embarrassing in Euro zone capitals and damaging to the Euro area's credibility
(Abdelghani et al.,2011).
The second proposed institution is the Gulf Central Bank (GCB) thatfocuses
on monitory policies by maintaining price stability in the GMU and ensuring a stable
growth as well as managing the official resources of the GCC member states. The
GCC member states have agreed on such an institution, but the idea here is to adopt it
before the creation of the monetary union according with the agreed timetable.
Last, but not least, the third proposed institution is Gulf Statistical Institution
(GSI) that transfers data collection from the hands of regional Ministries of Economy
and Planning to its own hand. The GSI will play an important role in providing
regional governments in the union, GMU institutions, and the market with real and
honest data that is not subject to manipulation, thus identifying risks that may the
Union may face before they escalate, as well as increasing the level of credibility.
Economic experts in the GCC region may come up with other ideas that support and
improve the coordination among the GCC member states, increase the level of
credibility, and entrench the concept of independence.
6-3-4 The fourth lesson: The union authority
GCC member states are obligated to help any member facing an economic
problem to maintain and enhance the economic power and the credibility of the
GMU. In contrast, GMU will have to have a supranational authority over all member
states that will impose upon them to not manipulate or mess with the monetary and
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fiscal policies they agreed on. GCC member states can create an Economic-Political
Assembly under the GMU--in collaboration with the GMF and GCB--that applies
strict penalties up to withdrawing membership against any member that violates
union economic policies. Moreover, this Assembly can increase the harmony between
the GCC governments. In addition, it identifies and approves the agreements and
economic decisions based on the guidance and data of independent institutions
mentioned above.
6-3-5 The fifth lesson: Omission of political motivation
Although the GMU is an economic construction, regional and international
politicalevents are considered as major motivationsandthe
biggestcatalystsforitsestablishment. TheGCC member states need to be more mature
dealing with the political circumstances. GCC member states should not rush to
establish the GMU; they have to be precise in determining rational economic policies
with the omission of political influence. On the other hand, GCC member states need
to be more serious achieving their goal (the monetary union). They have to strengthen
their efforts and adhere to the union establishment timetable regardless on the good
orbad regional and international political events.
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7- CONCLUSION
The GCC member states have not just achieved the fiscal convergence criteria
that were required to be a potential GMU member, but considerably surpassed them.
Though these criteria are literally quoted from the EMU criteria, theydo not fit the
GCC's economics condition and index which make them inappropriate for the GMU
and they do not suit the GCC economies. The GCC member statesshow enough
seriousness designing the GMU fiscal criteria by taking into account all differences
between their regional economy and the EU.
The EU economy’s size and structure are beyond the GCC economy.The EU
relies on heavy manufacturing sectors and high levels of diversification and is
considered as one of thelargest advanced economies in the world. However, the GCC
region highly depends on rich natural resources in oil, gas, and the activities related to
these resources,which means that the microeconomics shocks the GCC region may
face and its response are totally different than what has affected and will affect the
EU. Moreover, the European debt crisis that started in Greece and extended to
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italythreatens the whole Euro area, and perhaps the idea
of the GMU. In addition, the weakness of the fiscal discipline and fiscal harmony in
the EU, and the political role in this matter bring other challenges.
This paper is designed to help the GCC member states to be on the right track
and redesign their fiscal convergence criteria by finding the most efficient
strategies,not the exact fiscal reference values.In this regard, I conclude that instead
of adopting fiscal criteria that depend on deficit and high debt level strategies, GCC
needs to adopt criteria that depend on budget surplus and lower debt level strategies.
The question that could be raised to the economist in the GCC region is: what are the
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appropriate reference surpluses and debt values that GCC member states can
determine in their new design of the fiscal convergence criteria? In addition, due to
the high dependency of government budgets on oil and gas,GCC member states
should take into account oil and gas revenues–which considered as a main resource
for the GCC government revenues--and the government expenditure designing their
fiscal criteria to avoid any oil price shock influence as the one that happened in 2008.
The GCC member states should provide appropriate reference oil sector share and
government expenditure values that should not exceeded. An additional question for
the economist in the GCC region: what are the appropriate reference valuesof oil
sector share and expenditure? In this regard, GCC member states can study and
benefit from the case of the UAE’s economy which is considered as the second
largest economy in the GCC region, and which has maintained the lowest government
expenditure levels and the lowest oil sector. In addition, it has the most stable debt
level in the region.
The economists have to work on providing appropriate reference values of the
levels of debt, surplus, government expenditure, and oil and gas shares that work with
the GCC economies.
Regarding the fiscal discipline and the role of politics in it, this paperadvises
learning from the EU and the GCC member states’ experiences in a way to reach
fiscal discipline and strong fiscal policy in the GMU.In fact, the political will and the
need ofsurvival are the main motivations that stimulate the GCC leaders to move
toward the GMU,thus to achieve a regional unity.However, political intervention,
conflicts, mismanagement, and the lack of credibility contribute significantly and
directly in reducing the level of fiscal discipline in the union. Thus GCC member
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states have to limit the political influence andthe regional authority on fiscal policies,
and increase the harmony among them by promoting the permanent role of the
financial criteria. Furthermore, they have to determine an exact timetable of union
establishment that cannot be manipulated. However, they should not tolerate any
members joining that did not meet the criteria even if the target date has passed and
whatever the political desires and the circumstances. Moreover, they need to adopt an
independent decision-making mechanism and limit the political authority on
economic decisions. A way to achieve that goal is that GCC members must adopt
supranational independent institutionsbefore creating the GMU that will apply
multilateral surveillance on the Union’s economic activities. Indeed, several
proposedinstitutions could help the Union to reach the goal of independency such as
Gulf Monetary Fund (GMF), Gulf Central Bank (GCB) which is already processing,
and the Gulf Statistical Institution (GSI).
Although GCC member states are obligated to help any member facing an
economic problem, they have to have a supranational authority (Gulf EconomicPolitical Assembly) that requires all members to not manipulate or mess with the
monetary and fiscal policies they agreed on. This Assembly will increase the
harmony among the GCC governments, and identify and approve the agreements and
economic decisions based on the guidance and data of independence. Last, but not
least, GCC member states should not rush to establish the GMU because of political
influence. However, they need to be more serious achieving their goal (the monetary
union) regardless on the good orbad regional and international political events.
The ball is now in the court of GCC leaders. Either they submit to political
compromise to achieve the goal of closer fiscal integration and strong monetary union
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or they monopolize the decisions and face the probability of a crisis such as occurred
for the EMU.
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